Bank Liability Under the Antiterrorism Act:  The Mental State Requirement Under § 2333(a) by Chalos, Olivia G.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 85 Issue 1 Article 12 
2016 
Bank Liability Under the Antiterrorism Act: The Mental State 
Requirement Under § 2333(a) 
Olivia G. Chalos 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the National Security Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Olivia G. Chalos, Bank Liability Under the Antiterrorism Act: The Mental State Requirement Under § 
2333(a), 85 Fordham L. Rev. 303 (2016). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol85/iss1/12 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 303 
BANK LIABILITY UNDER THE 
ANTITERRORISM ACT:  THE MENTAL STATE 
REQUIREMENT UNDER § 2333(a) 
Olivia G. Chalos* 
 
Terrorism is at the forefront of international concern.  The United States 
devotes tremendous resources to disrupt terrorist networks, but the fight 
against terrorism continues to involve countless fronts.  Since September 
11, 2001, financial institutions have emerged as an increasingly popular 
target in efforts to cut off the flow of material support to terrorist 
organizations abroad.  Civil claims continue to be filed against banks, in 
part because of their “deep pockets.”  These claims generally allege that 
the banks provided material support to terrorist groups through the 
provision of financial services. 
The potential for large civil judgments against banks under the 
Antiterrorism Act (ATA), however, remains problematic in practice.  
Inconsistency in the interpretation and application of ATA civil liability 
limits the statute’s effectiveness.  It encourages forum shopping and creates 
the potential for disparate judgments depending on the court where an 
action is filed. 
This Note specifically addresses the jurisdictional split on the mental 
state requirement necessary to hold a defendant liable under the ATA.  This 
Note explores the current judicial interpretations of the statute and 
concludes that, as the statute stands, the Second Circuit best interprets the 
mental state requirement for § 2333(a) claims predicated on a violation of 
material support laws.  This Note proposes, however, that Congress should 
amend the ATA to clarify the state-of-mind requirement and should only 
allow for a cause of action where a bank manifests heightened culpability 
through intentional wrongdoing in the provision of financial services to 
foreign terrorist organizations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On Tuesday, August 2, 2005, on a central street in downtown Basra, a 
group of men, dressed in police uniforms and driving a police sedan, 
kidnapped Steven C. Vincent, a freelance writer and blogger, and his 
interpreter and close friend, Nooriya Tuaiz.1  Later that day, Vincent’s body 
was found three miles north of the city center.2  He had been shot three 
times in the chest and his hands were tied together with plastic wire.3  There 
were bruises on his face and right shoulder.4  Tuaiz, also shot, narrowly 
survived the attack.5  Just three days earlier, the New York Times had 
 
 1. Edward Wong, U.S. Journalist Who Wrote About Police Corruption Is Abducted and 
Killed in Basra, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/04/world/ 
middleeast/us-journalist-who-wrote-about-police-corruption-is.html [https://perma.cc/QJJ8-
J7WP]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Anthony Ramirez, Slain Reporter Is Recalled as Intrepid on Art or War, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 4, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/04/nyregion/slain-reporter-is-recalled-as-
intrepid-on-art-or-war.html [https://perma.cc/2E5Z-7JZ4]. 
2016] BANK LIABILITY UNDER THE ATA 305 
published Vincent’s op-ed article, “Switched Off in Basra,” exposing 
Iranian infiltration of the police force in Southern Iraq.6 
Vincent was the first journalist killed in the Iraq War.7  He is, however, 
one of the thousands of people killed by acts of terrorism in the last decade, 
and now his wife is one of hundreds of people seeking civil redress in U.S. 
courts.8  In November 2014, Vincent’s widow, along with other relatives of 
American soldiers and civilians injured or killed by Iranian-backed terrorist 
groups, filed suit in the Eastern District of New York.9  The case, Freeman 
v. HSBC Holdings PLC,10 is named for the lead plaintiff, Charlotte 
Freeman, whose husband Brian, an Army captain, died in a militant attack 
in Karbala, Iraq, in 2007.11  The complaint does not target the terrorists 
responsible for the attacks but instead names five of the largest banks in the 
world:  Barclays, HSBC Holdings, Standard Chartered, Credit Suisse Group 
AG, and Royal Bank of Scotland NV.12  The plaintiffs allege, among other 
claims, that the banks committed acts of international terrorism by 
supporting terrorist groups through the provision of financial services.13 
The Freeman case represents a growing trend in civil claims brought 
against banks and other secondary actors under the Antiterrorism Act 
(ATA).14  In the wake of terrorist attacks, victims and their families are 
often left with a troubling reality:  they have little chance of hailing those 
directly responsible into court.  Civil liability for those who provide 
material support to terrorist groups is therefore thought to serve several 
purposes:  (1) it allows victims and their families to hold anyone in the 
chain of causation directly accountable,15 (2) it allows for potentially 
 
 6. Id.; see also Steven Vincent, Switched Off in Basra, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/31/opinion/switched-off-in-basra.html [https://perma.cc/ 
6SVB-3YBK]. 
 7. See Wong, supra note 1. 
 8. See Paul Barrett, The Big Bet to Hold Banks Liable for Terrorism, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-19/are-
credit-suisse-rbs-standard-chartered-hsbc-and-barclays-terrorist-banks- [https://perma.cc/4B 
MR-VRUQ]. 
 9. Id. 
 10. No. 14-CV-06601 (E.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 10, 2014). 
 11. Barrett, supra note 8. 
 12. See Amended Complaint at 5, Freeman, No. 14-CV-06601 (Apr. 2, 2015), ECF No. 
77. 
 13. See id. 
 14. In the last decade, ATA cases also have been brought against oil companies, food 
distribution companies, and other major corporations. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, ANTI-
TERRORISM ACT LIABILITY FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1 (2014), https:// 
www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_AntiTerrorism_Act_Liability_for
_Financial_Institutions_09242014.pdf [https://perma.cc/LMY2-AXTL]; see also, e.g., In re 
Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute & S’holder Derivative Litig., 792 F. Supp. 2d 
1301 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (bringing ATA claims against Chiquita, a banana company, alleging 
that it paid and provided weapons and ammunition to Colombian paramilitary and guerilla 
groups to gain competitive advantage over other banana growers). 
 15. See, e.g., Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 944 F. Supp. 2d 215, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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significant financial recourse,16 and (3) it encourages banks to “think twice” 
about their role in terrorism’s causal chain.17 
Financial institutions therefore remain a major target in efforts to prevent 
and combat terrorist financing and support.18  In general, there are three 
types of cases brought against banks under the ATA19:  (1) financial 
services that directly benefit terrorist organizations, including the provision 
of nonroutine bank services on behalf of the terrorist group;20 (2) routine 
financial services with terrorist organizations, such as transactions done 
predominantly by computers;21 and (3) violations of laws regarding 
financial transactions with states sponsoring terrorism.22 
The majority of claims against banks are brought in federal court in New 
York.  A number of courts, however, remain divided over the scope of the 
ATA and how to apply it in banking cases.23  There are two primary issues 
with the statute’s application24:  (1) The ATA does not explicitly provide 
for aiding and abetting liability and (2) § 2333(a) does not include a state-
of-mind requirement.25  As to the first issue, which is beyond the scope of 
 
 16. See, e.g., Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1011 (7th Cir. 
2002) (discussing how banks provide a good alternative for civil recourse because few 
terrorist organizations are likely to have cash assets or property located in the United States 
that could be used to fulfill a civil judgment).  This Note refers to the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in 2002, which held that § 2333(a) permits a secondary cause of liability, as Boim I.  
In 2007, the Seventh Circuit took up the issue again in Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for 
Relief & Development (Boim II), 511 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2007).  The Seventh Circuit then 
reviewed and vacated the Boim II decision en banc in 2008, holding against secondary 
liability. See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III), 549 F.3d 685, 705 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 17. See generally Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 18. Terrorist financing refers to the act of knowingly providing something of value to 
persons and groups engaged in terrorist activity. See Jeffrey Breinholt, The Revolution of 
Substantive Criminal Counterterrorism Law:  “Material Support” and Its Philosophical 
Underpinnings, in THE LAW OF COUNTERTERRORISM 91, 98 (Lynne K. Zusman ed., 2011). 
 19. VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, ATA Banking Cases, in 2 LITIGATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 9:43 (2005). 
 20. Id.; see also Linde, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 216. 
 21. NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 19. 
 22. Id.; see also Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 94 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 23. See Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 2014); Boim 
v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III), 549 F.3d 685, 705 (7th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc). 
 24. The ATA has been criticized on these two bases as being an ineffective remedy for 
victims of terrorism and “little more than a pyrrhic or moral victory against the perpetrators 
of acts of international terrorism.” Jimmy Gurulé, Holding Banks Liable Under the Anti-
Terrorism Act for Providing Financial Services to Terrorists:  An Ineffective Legal Remedy 
in Need of Reform, 41 J. LEGIS. 184, 185, 219 (2015). 
 25. See id. at 206.  The Second and Seventh Circuits do not recognize secondary 
liability.  The courts rely on the analysis of Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 181–82 (1994), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 does not permit a private cause of 
action on an aiding and abetting theory unless explicitly written into the statute. See Weiss v. 
Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 609, 621 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Boim III, 
549 F.3d at 691.  To find liability in jurisdictions that recognize aiding and abetting liability, 
the provision of financial services by the bank must have “substantially assist[ed]” the 
principal violation.  Plaintiffs do not have to prove that the bank’s provision of financial 
services was the proximate cause of the attack. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 185–86; see Wultz 
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this Note, banks are not the direct actors carrying out the attack—the 
terrorists are.  The question is:  How far removed from a violent act can an 
action be to still be an activity “involved” in that act?26  Courts are deeply 
divided over whether the ATA allows for secondary liability on the theory 
that a bank aided or abetted the acts of terrorism.27 
This Note specifically addresses the second issue:  The disagreement 
over the mental state requirement for claims brought under the ATA.  This 
Note analyzes primary liability in private suits against banks for alleged 
violations of the material support and terrorist financing statutes,28 
specifically focusing on the different standards applied by the Second and 
Seventh Circuits.  Neither circuit recognizes aiding and abetting liability 
under the ATA.29  The courts, however, disagree on the requisite level of 
fault to establish civil liability under § 2333(a) and whether a claim under 
§ 2333(a) requires deliberate wrongdoing on the part of the bank.30  The 
ATA is silent on this issue. 
For example, in the Seventh Circuit, a victim must demonstrate that a 
bank violated an underlying criminal offense and engaged in deliberate 
wrongdoing.31  Deliberate wrongdoing may be satisfied by criminal 
recklessness.32  This places a heavy burden on plaintiffs to prove that the 
bank knew, or was “substantially certain,” that the provision of financial 
services would be used to commit an act of terrorism.33 
In the Second Circuit, however, a bank may be liable under the ATA if it 
provides financial services with the knowledge that the customer or 
beneficiary engages in acts of terrorism.34  A plaintiff must only show that a 
bank violated a criminal offense, for example, by knowing or being 
deliberately indifferent to the fact that its customer was collecting money 
 
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 57 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Halberstam v. 
Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
 26. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1012 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 27. The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) is currently before 
Congress.  If enacted, the bill would explicitly allow secondary liability under the ATA.  It 
would amend § 2333 by adding:  “In an action arising under subsection (a), liability may be 
asserted as to the person or persons who committed such act of international terrorism or any 
person or entity that aided, abetted, or conspired with the person or persons who committed 
such an act of international terrorism.” See H.R. REP. NO. 113-3143, at 7 (2013). 
 28. Liability is found, through statutory incorporation, for secondary actors who are 
primarily liable for providing material support in violation of a criminal law. See Boim III, 
549 F.3d at 691. 
 29. See Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2013) (dismissing aiding and 
abetting claims under the ATA); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 944 F. Supp. 2d 215, 216 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (applying Rothstein to dismiss conspiracy-based claims under the ATA on 
the basis that the ATA does not provide for secondary liability).  The Second Circuit 
recognized secondary liability prior to 2012. See Alison Bitterly, Note, Can Banks Be Liable 
for Aiding and Abetting Terrorism?:  A Closer Look into the Split on Secondary Liability 
Under the Antiterrorism Act, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3398 (2015). 
 30. See Gurulé, supra note 24, at 186, 219. 
 31. Id. at 219. 
 32. See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 693. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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for a foreign terrorist organization (FTO).35  The bank does not need to 
engage in additional “deliberate wrongdoing,” and plaintiffs do not need to 
demonstrate that the defendant knew, intended, or recklessly disregarded 
that the funds likely would be used to finance a terrorist attack.36 
Despite the potential benefits of ATA claims, the current framework 
creates inconsistent and disparate civil judgments.  It incentivizes filing in 
particular courts based on varying theories of liability and culpability 
requirements.  The disagreement among courts is problematic.  Although a 
jury held a bank liable under the ATA for the first time in September 
2014,37 the current application of the statute casts doubts on whether it will 
be an effective, or merely symbolic, means of future recourse for victims of 
terrorism.  Moreover, the current use of the statute also threatens to create 
expansive and potentially destructive liability for banks and other secondary 
actors. 
Part I of this Note presents background on the ATA’s legislative history 
and statutory language.  Part I also summarizes the material support and 
terrorist financing laws and their statutory incorporation into § 2333(a) 
claims against banks.  Next, Part II explores the conflict over whether the 
ATA requires a mental state beyond that of the underlying predicate offense 
of international terrorism.  It also addresses the implications of current 
judicial interpretations of the statute.  Then, Part III argues that the law, in 
its current form, supports the Second Circuit’s analysis of the ATA’s state-
of-mind requirement.  It also explores the interpretive infirmities of primary 
liability under the ATA and proposes that Congress should amend the 
statute.  Congress should clarify the state-of-mind requirement for 
§ 2333(a) primary liability and should allow for a cause of action only 
where a bank manifests heightened culpability through intentional 
wrongdoing in the provision of financial services to FTOs. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
This part discusses the ATA’s development and the relevant statutory 
provisions.  It also discusses the material support and terrorist financing 
statutes, which generally serve as the predicate offenses for ATA claims 
against banks. 
A.  ATA Legislative History 
The Antiterrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), provides a private right of 
action to any U.S. national “injured in his or her person, property, or 
 
 35. See id. at 206–09. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See Verdict Form, Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(No. 04-cv-2799), 2014 WL 4913320.  The case was settled for an undisclosed amount three 
days before the damages trial was set to begin. See Stephanie Clifford, Arab Bank Reaches 
Settlement in Suit Accusing It of Financing Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2015), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/08/15/nyregion/arab-bank-reaches-settlement-in-suit-accusing-it-
of-financing-terrorism.html [https://perma.cc/NB7H-AX99]. 
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business by reason of[38] an act of international terrorism.”39  The statute 
was enacted, among other reasons, to complement existing criminal 
sanctions by creating a private cause of action for victims of terrorism.40  In 
passing the ATA, Congress envisioned a statute whose scope would extend 
beyond terrorists and allow for liability at numerous points in the causal 
chain.41 
The first Antiterrorism Act was enacted in 1987 in direct response to the 
1985 murder of Leon Klinghoffer, a U.S. citizen.42  On October 7, 1985, 
members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) hijacked the 
Achille Lauro, an Italian cruise ship, shot Klinghoffer, and dumped his 
body into the Mediterranean Sea.43  Klinghoffer’s family brought suit 
against the PLO claiming that the murder was an act of international 
terrorism perpetrated by a terrorist organization.44  The District Court for 
the Southern District of New York exercised jurisdiction over the PLO 
because the crime took place in international waters and therefore fell under 
federal admiralty jurisdiction and the Death on the High Seas Act.45  Had 
Klinghoffer’s murder occurred within a foreign state instead of navigable 
waters, a court likely would not have upheld jurisdiction.46  The 
Klinghoffer case illustrated a jurisdictional gap in efforts to develop a 
comprehensive legal response to international terrorism.47  To fill the gap, 
Congress drafted the ATA and established a civil cause of action for 
victims of terrorism. 
Congress enacted the second Antiterrorism Act in 1990.48  It created 
several terrorism-related provisions, including the ATA’s civil provision 
and the definition of international terrorism currently in effect.49  Sections 
2333–2338 (excluding §§ 2332a–2332h) provide U.S. nationals with civil 
 
 38. Many courts interpret the “by reason of” requirement to be the same as the 
requirement in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1961–1968 (2012). See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1011 
(7th Cir. 2002) (“The Supreme Court has interpreted identical language [in the RICO statute] 
to require a showing of proximate cause.”); see also Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 
U.S. 258, 265–68 (1992) (holding that in civil RICO cases, “by reason of” requires a 
showing that the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury). 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). 
 40. The Constitution confers upon Congress the power to punish crimes against the law 
of nations and to carry out the treaty obligations of the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 10; see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
 41. Stephen I. Landman, Bank Liability Under the Anti-Terrorism Act:  Dispelling the 
“Routine Banking Services” Defense in Material Support Cases 19 (Dec. 9, 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1314104 
[https://perma.cc/JX76-PWB2]. 
 42. Pub. L. No. 100-204, §§ 1001–1005, 101 Stat. 1406, 1406–07 (1987). 
 43. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), 
vacated, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. at 859. 
 46. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 47. See Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3398. 
 48. Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-519, § 132, 104 Stat. 2240, 2250. 
 49. See id. § 132, 104 Stat. at 2250–51; Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3397. 
310 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
remedies for acts of international terrorism, the district courts with 
jurisdiction, and a statute of limitations period for civil claims.50 
In 1991, the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 was repealed for technical 
reasons.51  In 1992, the substantive provisions of the ATA of 1990 were 
enacted again.52  By imposing “liability at any point along the causal chain 
of terrorism,” Congress sought to “interrupt, or at least imperil, the flow of 
money” to terrorist organizations.53  It designed the ATA to “allow victims 
to pursue renegade terrorist organizations, their leaders, 
and . . . resources”54 and hold them “accountable where it hurts them most:  
at their lifeline, their funds.”55 
B.  ATA Claims Against Banks 
Under § 2333(a), any U.S. national (or an estate, survivor, or heir) may 
sue for an injury sustained by an act of international terrorism for treble 
damages56 and attorney’s fees.57  The ATA, however, contains several 
limitations:  (1) it provides a cause of action only for U.S. nationals; (2) it 
bars civil actions against state sponsors of terrorism and codifies the act of 
state doctrine by barring claims arising from official acts of foreign 
governments;58 (3) it prohibits civil actions for injury or loss suffered by 
reason of “an act of war”;59 and (4) the Attorney General may stay any civil 
 
 50. See Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).  
Effective January 2, 2013, Congress passed an amendment to the ATA extending the statute 
of limitations from four to ten years. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, 126 Stat. 1632 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2335 
(2012)). 
 51. See Pub. L. No. 102-27, § 402, 105 Stat. 130, 155 (1991), amended by Military 
Construction Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 102-136, § 126, 105 Stat. 637, 643 (1991). 
 52. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 1003, 106 
Stat. 4506, 4521–24; Almog, 471 F. Supp. at 266.  The terrorism-related provisions are 
codified at §§ 2331–2338 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code.  Sections 2332a–2332h and §§ 2339–
2339D were enacted by other laws, including the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and the USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. 
 53. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1011 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 54. 138 CONG. REC. S17,254 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1992) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
 55. 136 CONG. REC. S14,284 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1990) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
 56. “Damages that, by statute, are three times the amount of actual damages that the 
fact-finder determines is owed.” Treble Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
 57. See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012).  The first successful terrorism case under the ATA 
was Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 402 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2005).  It resulted in 
a $116 million judgment against the PLO and Palestinian Authority on behalf of the family 
of an American citizen murdered by terrorists in Israel. See id. at 276, 279. 
 58. Section 2337(2) does not allow suits against a “foreign state, an agency of a foreign 
state, or an officer or employee of a foreign state or an agency thereof acting within his or 
her official capacity or under color of legal authority.” 18 U.S.C. § 2337(2).  For a critique of 
sovereign immunity in civil claims against state sponsors of terror, see John Norton Moore, 
Civil Litigation Against Terrorism:  Neglected Promise, in LEGAL ISSUES IN THE STRUGGLE 
AGAINST TERROR (John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 2010). 
 59. “[C]ourts have consistently construed . . . ‘act of war’ to exclude deliberate attacks 
against innocent civilians.” Gurulé, supra note 24, at 189; see also Sokolow v. Palestine 
Liberation Org., 583 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that targeting civilians 
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action brought under § 2333, or limit or stop discovery if the action would 
interfere with criminal prosecution or a national security operation.60 
ATA liability occurs through an intricate series of statutory 
incorporations.61  Courts describe claims brought under the ATA as “akin 
to a Russian matryoshka doll, with statutes nested inside of statutes.”62  To 
sustain a § 2333(a) claim, plaintiffs must prove three formal elements:  (1) 
the defendant must commit an “act of international terrorism,” (2) the 
defendant must act with the mens rea required to prove a predicate act 
qualifying as international terrorism, and (3) the injury of a U.S. national 
must be “by reason of”63 a crime that constitutes an act of international 
terrorism.64 
“International terrorism”65 is defined by § 2331(1) to mean activities that 
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that 
would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the 
United States or of any State; 
(B) appear to be intended[66]— 
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
 
outside of a combat or military zone did “not constitute acts of war for purposes of the 
ATA”); Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 424 F. Supp. 2d 153, 166 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding that 
an attack on a public bus in Israel was not committed “in the course of” armed conflict and 
thus did not come within “act of war” exception to liability under the ATA). 
 60. See Gurulé, supra note 24, at 189. 
 61. See Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 62. Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 542, 553 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Schwab 
v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1032 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
 63. Courts have interpreted the proximate cause requirement differently. Compare 
Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (requiring plaintiffs asserting ATA 
civil claims to plausibly allege proximate cause and affirming dismissal of ATA claims 
against a European bank), and Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265–68 
(1992) (requiring proximate cause for plaintiff to recover under treble damages provision of 
RICO, that is, a direct relation between conduct alleged and injury asserted), with Wultz v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 57 (D.D.C. 2010) (requiring “a causal 
connection” between the injury and the conduct complained of which occurs where the 
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant). 
 64. Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 580 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Gurulé, supra 
note 24, at 189.  Some courts have phrased the requisite elements as (1) unlawful action, (2) 
the requisite mental state, and (3) causation. See, e.g., Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 502. 
 65. This definition is the same as the definition of “international terrorism” provided in 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012)). 
 66. The Seventh Circuit has issued several decisions in the Boim line of cases that 
establish a different standard from the Second Circuit, including “foreseeability” as the 
dispositive factor in proving whether acts “appear to be intended” for a terrorist purpose. 
Gurulé, supra note 24, at 193–94.  If it were foreseeable that the provision of material 
support would facilitate a terrorist attack, then such contribution would “appear to be 
intended” for a terrorist-related purpose. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim 
III), 549 F.3d 685, 694 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (stating that the “appear to be intended” 
requirement “is not a state-of-mind requirement; it is a matter of external appearance rather 
than subjective intent”). 
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(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or 
coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping; and 
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, 
or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are 
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or 
the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.67 
C.  Material Support Statutes 
To satisfy the “act of international terrorism” requirement, a defendant 
first must violate a predicate criminal offense.68  The material support69 and 
terrorist financing statutes, §§ 2339A, 2339B, and 2339C, generally serve 
as the predicate criminal offenses for ATA claims against banks.70  The 
statutes prohibit the provision of material support or financing to terrorist 
organizations and provide for punishments including the imposition of large 
fines and imprisonment.71  Courts have construed violations of the material 
support statutes as “acts dangerous to human life”72 that satisfy the “appear 
to be intended” and transnational components of “international terrorism” 
for § 2333(a) purposes.73 
The material support statutes are doctrinally innovative.74  Unlike 
traditional criminal complicity, which involves phrases such as aid or abet, 
 
 67. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (emphasis added).  Courts hold that the ATA applies to 
transnational acts of terrorism. See, e.g., Smith ex rel. Smith v. Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(C)). 
 68. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A); Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 553 (“Pleading and proving the 
violation of a predicate criminal provision is required to satisfy the first requirement of an 
ATA claim, [a] violation of a federal or state criminal law.”).  There is criticism over 
congressional intent to incorporate crimes—for example, the material support statutes—into 
the civil provision of the ATA.  The material support laws were passed half a decade after 
the ATA. See Geoffrey Sant, So Banks Are Terrorists Now?:  The Misuse of the Civil Suit 
Provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 533, 559 (2013). 
 69. Robert M. Chesney notes that the “material support law is one part of a matrix of 
terrorism-support laws” that have accrued from government efforts to put a stop to persons 
providing support, well-intentioned or otherwise, to FTOs. Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper 
Scenario:  Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 4 
(2005). 
 70. To fully satisfy the international terrorism requirement, a defendant’s acts must also 
meet the “appear to be intended” requirements and contain a transnational component. See 
supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also Gurulé, supra note 24, at 190. 
 71. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a). 
 72. The “appear to be intended” requirement has generated some controversy.  See 
Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3428 (explaining that the “appear to be intended” requirement is 
often overlooked and is inconsistent with the general understanding of primary liability 
under the ATA). 
 73. See Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., No. 06-CV-0702 (CPS), 2006 WL 2862704, at 
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006) (“Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B and § 2339C are recognized 
as international terrorism under 18 U.S.C. [§] 2333(a).”); accord Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 
384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 74. See NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 113 (2d ed. 
2005).  The material support laws are different from traditional forms of complicity liability; 
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material support is defined by listing categories of prohibited conduct.75  
The material support laws fit squarely within the U.S. counterterrorism 
tradition for this reason.76  They are strategically overinclusive;77 crimes are 
based on how terrorists behave, even if they reach conduct, such as the 
donation of funds, that is not overtly dangerous.78 
“Material support” is defined broadly by the statutes and typically 
includes the provision of financial services.79  Some courts hold that the 
materiality requirement is fulfilled by “routine” banking services including 
opening and maintaining bank accounts, collecting funds, transmitting 
funds, and providing credit card services.80  Banks often challenge liability 
on the basis that they provided only “routine banking services.”81  A 
number of courts reject this argument, however, explaining that even the 
provision of “routine banking services,” when knowingly provided to a 
terrorist, subjects a bank to liability.82 
The first material support law was codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A 
following the 1993 World Trade Center Bombings.83  The new enforcement 
paradigm specifically focused on terrorist financing.84  Section 2339A 
prohibits the provision of “material support or resources . . . knowing or 
intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a 
violation” of one or more of enumerated predicate offenses.85  The 
proscribed offenses include crimes typically associated with terrorism, 
including those involving aircrafts and airports; arson; chemical, biological, 
and nuclear weapons; murder; explosives; hostage taking; and damage to 
 
the provision of material support is itself an independent substantive offense, with its own 
penalty, rather than a form of secondary liability to a substantive offense. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Breinholt, supra note 18, at 99. 
 77. The overinclusiveness has been challenged as unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 18 (2010). 
 78. Breinholt, supra note 18, at 99.  The Constitution recognizes certain financial 
transactions as protected by the First Amendment and guaranteed freedoms of speech and 
association. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 79. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A(b), 2339B(g)(4) (2012). 
 80. See Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 609, 624 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006).  Some courts have declined to hold banks liable for injuries following routine banking 
services, holding that the link between the bank and the injury was too tenuous to afford 
relief. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 833 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 81. In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 832; see also Linde v. 
Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (rejecting the bank’s attempt to 
escape liability on the theory that it provided only routine services, and finding that the 
bank’s provision of services exceeded what could reasonably be considered “routine”). 
 82. See Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 936 F. Supp. 2d 100, 118 (E.D.N.Y. 
2013), vacated and remanded, 768 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2014); see also infra Part I.J.2. 
 83. Bitterly, supra note 29, at 400; see also Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339A). 
 84. Breinholt, supra note 18, at 98.  Before, enforcement for similar conduct could be 
accomplished only through money-laundering prosecutions. Id. at 99. 
 85. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a). 
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U.S. property, communication systems, and energy facilities.86  Section 
2339A only criminalizes acts in which there is intent for the material 
support to be used in acts of terrorism or operations.87 
In early practice, § 2339A proved difficult to enforce.88  In the years 
immediately following September 11, 2001, cases involving charities 
dominated terrorist financing prosecutions.89  Under § 2339A, a person 
easily could avoid liability by showing that he or she thought the money 
would be spent on benign activities.90  The law largely was ineffective for 
two reasons:  (1) terrorist organizations often engage in legitimate 
philanthropic and humanitarian efforts91 and (2) successful prosecution 
required tracing donor funds to a particular act of terrorism, a “practical 
impossibility.”92  Nevertheless, there has been an increase in recent cases 
charging this offense.93 
In 1996, Congress enacted § 2339B, the most frequently charged terrorist 
financing crime, to expand the effective scope of the material support law.94  
Section 2339B was signed into law as part of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 in response to the Oklahoma City 
bombing.95  It did not become fully operational until the Secretary of State 
issued the first list of Designated FTOs on October 7, 1997.96 
Section 2339B prohibits “knowingly provid[ing] material support or 
resources to a foreign terrorist organization.”97  To violate the provision, a 
person must act with “knowledge that the organization is a designated 
foreign terrorist organization . . . that the organization has engaged or 
engages in terrorist activity . . . or that the organization has engaged or 
engages in terrorism.”98  “Engages in terrorist activity” is defined to include 
“solicit[ing] funds or other things of value for . . . a terrorist organization 
described in clause (vi)(I)” of the Immigration and Nationality Act.99  
 
 86. Michael Taxay, Larry Schneider & Katherine Didow, What to Charge in a Terrorist 
Financing or Facilitation Case, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULL., Sept. 2014, at 9, 10. 
 87. See Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3400; see also Chesney, supra note 69, at 13 n.73. 
 88. See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1011 (7th Cir. 2002) (an 
early ATA case brought alleging § 2339A claims). 
 89. See, e.g., id. 
 90. The statute also did not allow for investigations based on “activities protected by the 
First Amendment, including expressions of support or the provision of financial support for 
the nonviolent political, religious, philosophical, or ideological goals or beliefs of any person 
or group.” SUSAN N. HERMAN, TAKING LIBERTIES:  THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE EROSION 
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 28 (2011). 
 91. Chesney, supra note 69, at 13. 
 92. Id. (quoting JOHN ROTH, DOUGLAS GREENBURG & SERENA WILLE, MONOGRAPH ON 
TERRORIST FINANCING:  STAFF REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST 
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 31–32 (2004), http://www.9-11commission.gov/ 
staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVA9-F6MU]). 
 93. Taxay, Schneider & Didow, supra note 86, at 9. 
 94. Breinholt, supra note 18, at 101. 
 95. HERMAN, supra note 90, at 28. 
 96. Breinholt, supra note 18, at 101. 
 97. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012); see also infra Part I.D (discussing the designation 
of FTOs). 
 98. 18 U.S.C. § 2339. 
 99. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
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Additionally, under § 2339B, “any financial institution that becomes aware 
that it has possession of, or control over FTO funds must retain possession 
of, or maintain control over, such funds, and report it to the Secretary.”100 
The § 2339B statute centers on the belief that organizations that engage 
in terrorist activities are “so tainted by their criminal conduct that any 
contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.”101  The 
provision is designed to criminalize all financial supporters of terrorists, 
including those who fund terrorism in the guise of philanthropic and 
charitable activities.102  It is the most frequently charged of the terrorist 
financing statutes.103 
Section 2339C is the primary and only terrorist financing statute that 
addresses the collection of funds.104  It was enacted in 2001 as part of the 
USA PATRIOT Act and implements the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.105  Section 2339C punishes the 
provision or collection of funds “with the intention that such funds be used, 
or with the knowledge that such funds are to be used, in full or in part, in 
order to carry out” a statutorily enumerated predicate crime.106  The 
predicate offenses are those prohibited under international law by a 
counterterrorism treaty,107 or any act 
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any 
other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of 
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is 
to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.108 
“Provides” includes “giving, donating and transmitting,” and “collects,” 
means both “raising and receiving funds.”109 
Prosecutors rarely use § 2339C110 because it overlaps with §§ 2339A and 
2339B, has limited jurisdictional reach compared to other terrorist financing 
 
 100. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(2).  Any financial institution that knowingly fails to comply is 
subject to a civil penalty in an amount that is the greater of $50,000 per violation or twice the 
amount of which the financial institution was required under subsection (a)(2) to retain 
possession or control. Id. 
 101. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
§ 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (emphasis added). 
 102. RICHARD M. PIOUS, THE WAR ON TERRORISM AND THE RULE OF LAW 78 (2008). 
 103. Taxay, Schneider & Didow, supra note 86, at 9. 
 104. Id. at 11.  Section 2339C also covers concealment, applying to a person who 
“knowingly conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of any 
material support or resources, or any funds or proceeds of such funds” if he or she knows or 
intends that the support or resources are to be provided in violation of §§ 2339B or 2339C. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(c). 
 105. See JIMMY GURULÉ, UNFUNDING TERROR:  THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE FINANCING 
OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 318 n.157 (2009) (“Section 2339C was intended to implement the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which requires 
signatories to prosecute or extradite individuals who contribute to, or collect money for, 
terrorist groups.”). 
 106. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a). 
 107. Id.; see also Taxay, Schneider & Didow, supra note 86, at 11. 
 108. 18 U.S.C § 2339C(a)(1)(B). 
 109. Id. § 2339C(e)(3)–(4). 
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crimes, and requires specific intent that the funds are used to “carry out” an 
enumerated predicate act.111 
D.  Designating Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
The practice of list making is integral to the material support and terrorist 
financing laws.112  The United States publishes lists of designated persons 
and groups that are determined to be terrorists.113  It becomes a crime to 
engage in any financial transactions with a person or group on that list, 
regardless of whether the financial transaction itself is designed to promote 
acts of terrorism.114 
The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and 
Secretary of the Treasury, designates FTOs for a two-year period under 
§ 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.115  The designation is made 
if the Secretary finds that the group is foreign, engages in or has the 
capacity or intent to engage in terrorist activity, and threatens the security of 
U.S. nationals or the national security of the United States.116 
Several other lists also are relevant to terror financing enforcement.  The 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) allows for 
prosecution of persons who willfully engage in financial transactions with 
persons and organizations that the President has determined to be a threat to 
the United States.117  Under IEEPA authority, the Office of Foreign Assets 
Controls (OFAC) creates the Specially Designated Global Terrorists 
(SDGT) and State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) lists.118  The SDGT list 
includes all organizations on the State Department’s FTO list, plus more.119  
Under the IEEPA, OFAC is authorized to freeze bank accounts and block 
assets of entities appearing on the SDGT list, but it applies only to U.S. 
individuals and financial institutions.120  OFAC also maintains a list called 
 
 110. Taxay, Schneider & Didow, supra note 86, at 11. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3410. 
 113. Breinholt, supra note 18, at 101. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  FTO designations follow an exhaustive review process of information about a 
group’s activity taken from classified and open sources.  The State Department, working 
with the Justice and Treasury Departments and the intelligence community, prepares a 
detailed record of the terrorist activity of the proposed individual or group.  The State 
Department provides classified notification to Congress seven days before publishing an 
FTO designation in the Federal Register. Id. at 101–02. 
 116. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2012).  The D.C. Circuit held that designated FTOs 
may have a due process right to notice, disclosure of at least unclassified parts of the 
administrative record underlying their designation, and an opportunity to be heard. See Nat’l 
Council of Resistance v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  A designated 
organization has thirty days to obtain judicial review of the action from the D.C. Circuit. Id. 
at 196.  The court may overturn the action only if the Secretary acted unconstitutionally, 
illegally, or arbitrarily. Id. at 199. 
 117. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701. 
 118. See Breinholt, supra note 18, at 102. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3411. 
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the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) list, which 
combines OFAC and State Department lists, including SSTs.121 
E.  IEEPA Violations 
Terrorist financing cases occasionally include another criminal offense 
under 50 U.S.C. § 1705(c).  The statute criminalizes the willful violation of 
an executive order or an implementing regulation issued pursuant to 
IEEPA.122  Although IEEPA has extraterritorial reach, it is limited in 
comparison to the jurisdictional reach of the material support statutes.123 
F.  International Money Laundering 
In terrorist financing cases, prosecutors also sometimes include an 
international money laundering charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2).124  
The statute prohibits the transportation, transmission, or transfer of funds 
from a place inside the United States to a place outside the United States 
“with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful 
activity.”125  The list of unlawful activities is extensive; it includes the 
material support offenses, IEEPA violations, and many other terrorism-
related crimes.126  Section 1956(a)(2) effectively criminalizes “reverse” 
money laundering, or the movement of “clean” money overseas for an illicit 
purpose.127 
G.  Prosecutorial Guidance for Terrorist Financing Cases 
To fully understand the use of the material support and terrorist financing 
statutes in ATA civil suits, it is useful to look at prosecutorial guidance in 
this area.  The U.S. Attorney’s Bulletin advises: 
When considering how to charge a terrorist financing or facilitation case, 
the first step is to determine the intended recipient of the material support 
or resources.  The basic question is:  What terrorist or terrorist group is 
involved?  If the terrorist group is an FTO, prosecutors should consider a 
§ 2339B charge.  If the terrorist group is an SDGT (but perhaps not an 
FTO, for example, the Taliban), consider IEEPA.  If no FTO or SDGT is 
involved, but the support was intended to help prepare for or carry out an 
enumerated predicate offense, then look to § 2339A and/or § 2339C.  
Finally, where there is evidence that the defendant sent, or attempted to 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. 50 U.S.C. § 1705(c). 
 123. Taxay, Schneider & Didow, supra note 86, at 12.  The Supreme Court has held that 
to prove willful criminal conduct, the government must show that the defendant acted with 
knowledge that his conduct was unlawful; the government need not show that the defendant 
knew precisely which law was being violated. Id.; see Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 
191–97 (1998).  This is considered a higher mens rea standard than the “knowing” standard 
of § 2339B. Taxay, Schneider & Didow, supra note 86, at 12. 
 124. Taxay, Schneider & Didow, supra note 86, at 13. 
 125. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2). 
 126. Taxay, Schneider & Didow, supra note 86, at 13. 
 127. Id. 
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send, funds overseas, a charge of international money laundering may 
also be appropriate.128 
This prosecutorial guidance demonstrates the interplay between the 
material support statutes and the IEEPA statutes, and it also highlights the 
importance of the different designations discussed in Part I.D. 
H.  Hypothetical:  A Look at the  
Statutory Link to Liability 
Victim A, a U.S. citizen, is killed during an overseas terrorist attack 
perpetrated by FTO Z.  Bank 1 provided financial services for FTO Z in the 
days prior to the attack.  Victim A’s estate decides to bring a civil claim 
against Bank 1 under the ATA premised on the following statutory 
incorporations129: 
(1) Victim A’s estate brings the claim under § 2333(a) which provides a 
civil cause of action for injuries suffered by reason of an act of 
“international terrorism.”  “International terrorism,” is defined by § 2331 as 
“acts dangerous to human life” that are a violation of U.S. criminal laws 
and “appear intended” “to intimidate or coerce a civilian population.” 
(2) Victim A argues that Bank 1’s provision of financial services to FTO 
Z was an “act of international terrorism” as required by § 2333(a).  Victim 
A first alleges that FTO Z violated a U.S. criminal law (as required by 
§ 2331):  Victim A claims that, by providing financial services to an FTO, 
Bank 1 violated § 2333A, § 2339B, or the terrorist financing statute, 
§ 2339C.  Then, Victim A argues that by committing these crimes, Bank 1 
engaged in “acts dangerous to human life” that appeared intended to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population, meeting § 2331’s definition of 
“international terrorism” for § 2333(a) purposes. 
(3) The last statutory link is § 2332(a), which punishes whoever kills a 
U.S. national outside of the United States.  Victim A argues that Bank 1 
materially supported FTO Z, the terrorist group that killed a U.S. national, 
Victim A, overseas, which thus satisfies the § 2332(a) requirement. 
This “chain of incorporations” was specifically delineated by the Seventh 
Circuit in Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief & Development130 
(Boim III) for ATA claims against secondary actors: 
By this chain of incorporations by reference ([§] 2333(a) to [§] 2331(1) to 
[§] 2339A [or §§ 2339B or 2339C] to [§] 2332), we see that a donation to 
a terrorist group that targets Americans outside the United States may 
violate [§] 2333.  Which makes good sense as a counterterrorism measure.  
Damages are a less effective remedy against terrorists and their 
organizations than against their financial angels.131 
 
 128. Id. (emphasis added). 
 129. See supra Part I.B–C. 
 130. 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 131. Id. at 705. 
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I.  Proximate Cause Requirement 
in Primary Liability Jurisdictions 
To satisfy the proximate cause requirement in primary liability 
jurisdictions, plaintiffs also must prove that the provision of financial 
services was a “substantial factor” in the sequence of causation.132  “[T]here 
must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained 
of” and “the injury has to be fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action 
of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of 
some third party not before the court.”133  Second, the injury must have 
been “reasonably foreseeable” as a natural consequence of the bank’s 
provision of financial services.134  This is a tough and exacting standard.135 
J.  Mental State Requirement Under the ATA 
This section specifically addresses the second element of an ATA claim 
and the inconsistent interpretation of the § 2333(a) state-of-mind 
requirement.  As discussed, the second element of an ATA claim requires 
that, at a minimum, the defendant satisfy the mens rea requirement of the 
predicate act qualifying as international terrorism.136 
1.  Terrorist Financing 
and Material Support Mens Rea 
To understand the conflict over the § 2333(a) mental state requirement, it 
is important first to address the underlying criminal offenses.  The material 
support or terrorist financing statutes presumably will act as the predicate 
offenses for banks.  Each statute has its own mens rea requirement. 
Sections 2339A and 2339C require proof of a heightened mens rea.137  
To violate § 2339A, the defendant must provide material support or 
resources “knowing or intending” that they are used to carry out acts of 
terrorism.138  To violate § 2339C, the defendant must have provided or 
collected funds with the specific intent or knowledge that the funds were to 
be used to “carry out” enumerated predicate offenses related to terrorism.139  
Currently, no case law interprets the § 2339C “carry out” language; it 
remains an open question whether courts will find that it covers funds 
 
 132. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 185. 
 133. Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2014) (alterations in original) 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1975)). 
 134. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 203 n.125 (“Assuming plaintiff could demonstrate that 
[Arab] Bank acted recklessly, it has not shown that his—an American’s—injuries were 
reasonably foreseeable by [Arab] Bank as a result of the size and timing of funds transfers 
put in issue by plaintiff.” (quoting Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 542, 572 
(E.D.N.Y. 2012))). 
 135. Id. at 203. 
 136. See supra Part I.B.  The defendant must satisfy the first element of an ATA claim, an 
act of international terrorism, by meeting the (A) predicate criminal offense, (B) “appear to 
be intended,” and (C) international nexus requirements. See Gurulé, supra note 24, at 203. 
 137. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 196. 
 138. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012) (emphasis added). 
 139. See id. § 2339C (emphasis added). 
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intended to support a terrorist group’s general operational infrastructure.140  
Both statutes do not require specific intent to support the particular attacks 
that injured the plaintiffs, but the defendants must know or intend that the 
funds support terrorist acts.141 
By contrast, to violate § 2339B, the defendant must only have knowledge 
that the organization is a designated FTO or engages or has engaged in acts 
of terrorism.142  The defendant is not required to know or intend that the 
material support or resources would be used to carry out a violent crime.143  
Instead of tracing money from the United States to its use in terrorist acts, 
prosecutors must only establish that persons are engaged in financial 
transactions with persons they know are acting on behalf of designated 
terrorist groups and individuals.144  The accused need only agree to provide 
funds to a terrorist organization and send a payment in furtherance of that 
goal.145 
Courts hold that the knowledge requirement of § 2339B may be satisfied 
by evidence that a defendant acted with willful blindness regarding the 
organization.146  In In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001,147 the 
court found that a defendant must know that “the recipient of the material 
support . . . is an organization that engages in terrorist acts, or the defendant 
must be deliberately indifferent to whether or not the organization does 
so.”148  That is, the “defendant knows there is a substantial probability that 
the organization engage[s] in terrorism, but does not care.”149  Several 
courts agree with this analysis.150 
Although far-reaching, the § 2339B mens rea requirement has been 
upheld against challenges alleging vagueness and violations of the First 
Amendment rights to freedom of association and speech.151  In Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project,152 the U.S. Supreme Court resolved whether 
§ 2339B requires proof that the defendant acted with the specific intent to 
further the terrorist group’s illegal activities.153  It held that § 2339B only 
requires knowledge of the terrorist group’s status as a foreign terrorist 
 
 140. Taxay, Schneider & Didow, supra note 86, at 11. 
 141. See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 45, 47 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 142. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (emphasis added).  “Engaged or engages in terrorist activity” 
is defined in § 212(a)(3)(13) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  For further discussion 
on the requirements, see supra Part I.C. 
 143. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 191. 
 144. Breinholt, supra note 18, at 101. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 196. 
 147. 740 F. Supp. 2d 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 148. Id. at 517. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See, e.g., Strauss v. Credit Lyonaiss, S.A., 925 F. Supp. 2d 414, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 
2013); Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).  These courts have 
rejected arguments that “knowledge” in § 2339B for § 2333(a) claims requires plaintiffs to 
show that the defendant intended the funds, financial services, or support to be used for 
terrorist attacks. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 196. 
 151. See supra note 78. 
 152. 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 153. Id. 
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organization or participation in terrorist-related activities—not specific 
intent for violent acts.154 
2.  Culpability Determinations in ATA Cases 
To determine culpability under §§ 2339A, 2339B, and 2339C, courts 
look to the specific banking activities in each case.  The type of services 
that a bank provides may create a strong presumption of its mental state and 
knowledge about the terrorist organization and its activities.155  Nonroutine 
banking services, that is, those that are more unusual and specific, may 
suggest that the bank knew that its services were aiding terrorists.156  Courts 
look to a number of factors when considering a bank’s mental state, 
including client interaction and the “knowing and intentional nature of the 
[b]ank’s activities” in its provision of client services.157  Additionally, the 
potential for liability based on routine services may turn on whether the 
court recognizes aiding and abetting liability under the ATA.158 
The Second Circuit, in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 
held that the link between the bank’s routine services and plaintiffs’ injuries 
was too tenuous to afford relief, but the court left open the possibility of 
whether some routine banking services might qualify to establish primary 
liability.159 
The presence of nonroutine services, on the other hand, may demonstrate 
that the bank knew or intended that its services fund acts of terrorism.160  
The court in Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC161 found that the defendant bank far 
exceeded what is considered routine in its provision of services to terrorist 
groups.162  Thirteen civil lawsuits were filed against Arab Bank in the 
Eastern District of New York, between 2004 and 2011, by victims of 
suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks linked to Hamas.163  The 
plaintiffs alleged that the bank supported (1) Hamas, (2) charitable 
organizations that funded Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and (3) 
the Saudi Committee in Support of the Intifada Al Quds, and provided 
 
 154. “Congress plainly spoke to the necessary mental state for a violation of § 2339B, and 
it chose knowledge about the organization’s connection to terrorism, not specific intent to 
further the organization’s terrorist activities.” Id. at 11.  In Weiss v. National Westminster 
Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2014), the court primarily relied on the Holder Court’s 
analysis in assessing § 2333(a) mens rea requirements. See infra Part II.B. 
 155. Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3408–10. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See, e.g., Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).  
Evidence that a bank and a terrorist organization worked closely together to advance a 
common scheme or plan may also satisfy the “appear to be intended” requirement for 
proving a violation of the ATA. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 210. 
 158. See Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3408. 
 159. Id.  This case was decided before secondary liability was uniformly rejected in the 
Second Circuit. See Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 98 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 160. Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3409–10. 
 161. 384 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 162. See Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3409–10. 
 163. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, supra note 14, at 2. 
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“martyr insurance” to families of suicide bombers, including Hamas 
members.164 
While Linde has been cited to support bank liability for involvement with 
terrorist activities, it is unique for its facts.165  Arab Bank actively worked 
with terrorist entities to process payments for suicide bombers; it was not 
merely making transfers of funds in the ordinary course of providing 
services.  This behavior created a strong presumption of the bank’s 
knowledge and intent to directly support terrorist activities.166  A jury found 
the bank liable to plaintiffs in September 2014.167  To date, it is the first and 
only bank held liable under the ATA.168 
3.  Section 2333(a) Mental State Requirement 
Section 2333(a) is silent on the mental state required to trigger civil 
liability.169  In passing the ATA, Congress intended to incorporate general 
principles of tort law into the cause of action.170  It intentionally left it to 
courts, “according to the common law tradition,” to define the contours of 
the statute.171  In practice, the courts have been unable to resolve the 
requisite mental state issue.172 
Courts generally agree on several facets of civil claims under the ATA.  
They uniformly hold that the ATA is not a strict liability statute.173  A bank 
cannot be held liable solely because the money that funded a terrorist attack 
passed through the bank during routine banking services.174  They also 
agree that acting with mere negligence is insufficient to trigger liability.175 
 
 164. See Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3409. 
 165. See NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 19, § 9:43. 
 166. See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Given 
plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the knowing and intentional nature of [Arab] Bank’s 
activities, there is nothing ‘routine’ about the services the Bank is alleged to provide.”). 
 167. See Verdict Form, supra note 37. 
 168. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 169. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 195. 
 170. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“For 
harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to 
liability if he or she:  (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a 
common design with him or her, or (b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of 
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct him- or 
herself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and 
his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.”). 
 171. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 195 (quoting Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 
484 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 186; see Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 481–82, 505–06.  The Seventh Circuit 
emphasized this point:  “To hold defendants liable for donating money without knowledge of 
the donee’s intended criminal use of the funds would impose strict liability.” Boim v. 
Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1012 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 174. See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1012. 
 175. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 199.  Negligent conduct does not satisfy the requirement of 
knowledge or deliberate wrongdoing. Id.  In Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief & 
Development (Boim III), 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc), the Seventh Circuit noted 
that to impose liability, it would not be enough “that the average person or a reasonable 
person would realize that the organization he was supporting was a terrorist organization, if 
2016] BANK LIABILITY UNDER THE ATA 323 
Courts, however, remain divided on the requisite state of mind to sustain 
a civil judgment.176  They are split on whether the statute requires proof of 
a state of mind beyond that of the underlying offense qualifying as 
international terrorism.177  “Defining practical boundaries [is] problematic,” 
particularly in claims predicated on § 2339B, which does not contain the 
heightened mental state requirements of §§ 2339A or 2339C.178  “Some 
courts hold that the ATA requires proof of scienter.  Under this view, a 
bank is liable if the provision of financial services was conducted with 
knowledge that the customer or beneficiary of the services engages in acts 
of terrorism.”179  Others require that a bank also engage in “deliberate 
wrongdoing.”180 
Although plaintiffs may sustain an ATA claim by meeting the predicate 
offense mens rea requirement, to find liability under § 2333(a), they must 
still prove the third element:  the injury of a U.S. national must be “by 
reason of”181 a crime that constitutes an act of international terrorism.182 
II.  CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE § 2333(a) 
MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENT 
This part examines the split between the Seventh and Second Circuits in 
their attempts to clarify the mental state requirement of § 2333(a). 
A.  The Seventh Circuit and the Boim Line of Cases 
In 1996, David Boim, a seventeen-year-old American and Israeli citizen, 
was shot while waiting with his classmates at a bus stop near Jerusalem.183  
Boim’s murder was later attributed to two alleged members of Hamas.184  
In 2000, Boim’s parents filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois, 
naming not only Amjad Hinawi and Khalil Tawfiq Al-Sharif, the two men 
allegedly responsible for Boim’s death, but also nonprofit organizations and 
 
the actual defendant did not realize it.” Id. at 693.  This would be insufficient to prove 
knowledge or recklessness. 
 176. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 195.  “The substance of such an action is not defined by the 
statute, because the fact patterns giving rise to such suits will be as varied and numerous as 
those found in the law of torts.  This bill opens the courthouse door to victims of 
international terrorism.” S. REP. No. 102-342, at 45 (1992); see also Boim I, 291 F.3d at 
1011. 
 177. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 196. 
 178. NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 19. 
 179. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 186. 
 180. Id.  The mental state analysis is separate from the third element of an ATA claim, 
“by reason of,” which also requires proximate cause to sustain a judgment. See supra note 
38. 
 181. See supra Part I.I (discussing the proximate cause requirements for primary liability 
jurisdictions). 
 182. Courts look to a number of factors in assessing the “by reason of” requirement, 
including the time elapsed between the provision of services and the attack. See Rothstein v. 
UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 94 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 183. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III), 549 F.3d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 
2008) (en banc). 
 184. Id. 
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other individuals with alleged ties to Hamas.185  Two of the named 
defendants were the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) and the Quranic Literacy 
Institute (QLI).186  The Boims alleged that the two organizations were the 
main fronts for Hamas in the United States.187  Although the defendants 
were charities, not banks, courts consistently cite the Boim line of cases in 
banking cases.188 
The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint 
for failure to state a claim.189  The defendants argued that providing 
financial services does not constitute an act of international terrorism.190  
The Seventh Circuit authorized an interlocutory appeal and affirmed the 
district court.191  The case then resumed in the district court, which granted 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs with respect to the liability of the three 
defendants other than QLI.192  After damages were trebled and attorneys’ 
fees added, the jury entered a $52 million verdict against all the 
defendants.193 
The defendants appealed again, this time from a final judgment.  On 
appeal, the panel vacated the judgment and directed the district court to 
redetermine liability.194  However, the plaintiffs petitioned the Seventh 
Circuit for rehearing en banc.  The court granted the plaintiffs’ petition to 
“consider the elements of a suit under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 against financial 
supporters of terrorism.”195 
1.  Boim v. Holy Land Foundation (Boim III) 
In 2008, the Seventh Circuit reheard the case en banc and issued an 
opinion authored by Judge Richard Posner.196  The court’s en banc opinion 
addressed whether (1) § 2333 imposes primary, not secondary, liability on 
donors and supporters of terrorism through a series of statutory 
incorporations197 and (2) plaintiffs must satisfy the scienter requirements of 
§ 2333(a) regardless of whether §§ 2339A, 2339B, or 2339C serve as the 
predicate offense.198 
The court emphasized that, because the ATA is a federal tort statute, the 
traditional tort requirements of “fault, state of mind, causation and 
 
 185. Id. at 687–88. 
 186. Id. at 687. 
 187. Id. at 709. 
 188. See, e.g., Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 944 F. Supp. 2d 215, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 189. See Boim v. Quranic Literary Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1021 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
 190. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 688. 
 191. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 192. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 688. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim II), 511 F.3d 707, 707 (7th 
Cir. 2007). 
 195. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 688. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See id. at 689, 691–92 (“[S]tatutory silence on the subject of secondary liability 
means there is none.”). 
 198. Id. at 692. (“18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, B, and C . . . do not require proof that the material 
support resulted in an actual terrorist act, or . . . punish an attempt.”). 
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foreseeability” must be established for liability.  Judge Posner explained 
that the structure of the ATA provides for “[p]rimary liability in the form of 
material support to terrorism [with] the character of secondary liability,” 
through which Congress “expressly imposed liability on a class of aiders 
and abettors.”199  Because the primary violator is functionally “an aider and 
abettor or other secondary actor,” ordinary tort requirements do not 
apply.200  Instead, tort requirements for secondary actors are appropriate for 
ATA claims.201 
Applying this reasoning, Judge Posner specifically focused on the 
automatic trebling of damages under the ATA—a punitive damages 
provision.202  Because “something more than the mere commission of a tort 
is always required for punitive damages,” when they apply “[t]here must be 
circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or ‘malice,’ or a 
fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious 
and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be 
called willful or wanton.”203  On this basis, to satisfy § 2333(a), there must 
be proof of intentional misconduct or “deliberate wrongdoing” on the part 
of the defendant in addition to “the state-of-mind requirements” of the 
predicate criminal statutes upon which plaintiffs base their claims.204 
Judge Posner went on to explain that to satisfy the mens rea requirement 
for the predicate offense in § 2339B cases, a plaintiff must only show that 
the defendant either “knows that the organization engage[d] in acts [of 
terrorism] or is deliberately indifferent to whether it does or not, meaning 
that one knows there is a substantial probability that the organization 
engages in terrorism but one does not care.”205  It is insufficient to prove 
that a reasonable person would have realized that the organization was a 
terrorist group because “[t]hat would just be negligence.”206 
In assessing culpability for the second requirement—proof of “deliberate 
wrongdoing,”—Judge Posner likened giving “money to Hamas” to giving a 
loaded gun to a child.207  Providing funds to a terrorist organization 
“creat[es] a substantial risk of injury” and thus, is reckless and may 
generate personal liability.208  To determine a defendant’s level of 
knowledge, the court held that the fact finder should look to the risk:  “The 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See id. 
 202. See id. at 692–93 (“The very idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past, 
and to deter future, unlawful conduct.” (quoting Tex. Indus. Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 
451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981))). 
 203. Id. at 692 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 2 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 693. 
 208. Id. (“[I]f the child shoots someone you will be liable to the victim.”).  As the 
Seventh Circuit recognizes, “an activity is reckless when the potential harm . . . is wildly 
disproportionate to any benefits that the activity might be expected to confer.” United States 
v. Boyd, 475 F.3d 875, 877 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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greater the risk . . . the more obvious it will be to the risk taker, enabling the 
trier of fact to infer the risk taker’s knowledge of the risk with greater 
confidence.”209  The mental element required to fix liability, on a donor (or 
any individual providing material support), is present if the donor or 
supporter knows the character of the organization.  From there, “[a]nyone 
who knowingly contributes to [even] the nonviolent wing of an 
organization that he knows to engage in terrorism is knowingly contributing 
to the organization’s terrorist activities.”210  There is no “charity defense” 
or defense based on intent to support only the humanitarian efforts of the 
larger terrorist infrastructure.211  The court concluded that allowing “benign 
intent” to be a defense would practically “eliminate donor liability except in 
cases in which the donor was foolish enough to admit his true intent.”212  
Without an expansive interpretation of the ATA, “[d]onor liability would be 
eviscerated, and the statute would be a dead letter.”213 
Thus, in addition to proving the mens rea for the predicate crime of 
international terrorism, the Seventh Circuit requires plaintiffs to prove that 
the defendant had knowledge that the provision of material support or funds 
would assist the terrorist organization in committing a terrorist attack, or 
knowledge that the consequences were “substantially certain” to result from 
his risky conduct, and deliberately disregarded that fact.214  It is sufficient 
to show that the defendant “knew the entity had been designated as a 
terrorist organization and deliberately disregarded that fact while continuing 
to provide financial services to the organization with knowledge that the 
services would in all likelihood assist the organization in accomplishing its 
violent goals.”215 
2.  Summary of the Seventh Circuit’s 
Mental State Standard 
If an ATA claim is filed in Seventh Circuit, plaintiffs must satisfy two 
scienter requirements for claims predicated on a violation of § 2339B216:  
First, plaintiffs must prove the mens rea for the underlying statutory 
violation (alleged act of international terrorism).217  This often involves a 
claim that the bank provided financial services to an FTO in violation of 
§ 2339B.218  Plaintiffs must prove that the bank had knowledge of the 
terrorist group’s designation as an FTO or knowledge that the terrorist 
organization engaged or engages in terrorist activity.219  Knowledge can be 
 
 209. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 694. 
 210. Id. at 698. 
 211. Id. at 698–99. 
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 213. Id. at 702. 
 214. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 198. 
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 216. See id. at 201. 
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satisfied by deliberate indifference.220  Second, plaintiffs must also 
demonstrate “deliberate wrongdoing” by the defendant.  “Deliberate 
wrongdoing” may be satisfied by proof of criminal recklessness—that “the 
actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to 
result from his act.”221  The defendant must know, intend, or recklessly 
disregard, or it must be substantially certain, that the funds are being used to 
finance acts of terrorism.222 
For § 2339A or § 2339C claims, the deliberate wrongdoing requirement 
is satisfied if the defendant meets the mens rea for the predicate crime; both 
statutes already require that the defendant acted with the knowledge or 
intent for funds to be used to support acts of terrorism.223 
3.  Two Dissents in Boim III 
The dissenters in Boim III, Judges Ilana Rovner and Diane Wood, mainly 
disagree with the majority opinion regarding cases in which donations only 
indirectly benefit Hamas.  The majority assumes liability even in cases of 
indirect support.224  The dissents are useful in demonstrating the 
shortcomings of current interpretations of the statute and the problematic 
nature of the majority’s holding in Boim III.225 
B.  The Second Circuit’s 
State-of-Mind Requirement for § 2333(a) 
In Weiss v. National Westminster Bank PLC,226 the Second Circuit 
clarified the state-of-mind requirement for § 2333(a) claims predicated on a 
violation of § 2339B.  The Second Circuit does not require a state of mind 
beyond that required to prove a violation of the predicate criminal 
offense.227  This differs from the standard required for plaintiffs filing ATA 
claims in the Seventh Circuit following the en banc opinion in Boim III. 
The plaintiffs in Weiss were approximately 200 U.S. victims (or their 
estates, survivors, or heirs) of terrorist attacks launched in Israel by 
Hamas.228  The plaintiffs claimed that National Westminster Bank 
 
 220. Some courts refer to this as willful blindness. See Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 
925 F. Supp. 2d 414, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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 223. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 198; see also supra Part I.J.1. 
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 227. See id. at 204. 
 228. Id. 
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(“NatWest”) provided material support and resources to a terrorist 
organization in violation of the ATA by maintaining bank accounts and 
transferring funds for the Palestine Relief & Development Fund, also 
known as Interpal, a purported charity.229  Interpal allegedly engaged in 
“terrorist activity” by soliciting funds and otherwise providing support for 
Hamas, a designated terrorist organization.230  The district court dismissed 
plaintiffs’ claims on summary judgment, holding that the evidence 
demonstrated that NatWest did not have the requisite scienter to sustain a 
claim under the ATA.231 
The Second Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Pierre N. Leval, 
reversed and remanded the case.232  The court held that the district court 
applied an incorrect standard for determining whether NatWest acted with 
the requisite scienter for § 2333(a) liability predicated on a violation of 
§ 2339B(a)(1).233  The district court had improperly focused on NatWest’s 
lack of knowledge regarding the financing of specific terrorist acts, rather 
than focusing on its knowledge of Interpal’s ties to Hamas, a designated 
FTO.234 
The court noted that “[w]hile § 2333(a) does not include a mental state 
requirement on its face, it incorporates the knowledge requirement from 
§ 2339B(a)(1).”235  Relying on Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,236 it 
explained that § 2339B “prohibits the knowing provision of any material 
support to terrorist organizations without regard to the types of activities 
supported.”237  In reinstating the claims, the Second Circuit held that 
liability may therefore be sustained where the defendant had knowledge 
that, or exhibited deliberate indifference to whether, it provided material 
support to a terrorist organization.238  Because Hamas is designated as an 
FTO, to be liable, plaintiffs were required to show only “that NatWest had 
actual knowledge that Interpal provided material support to Hamas, 
or . . . deliberate indifference to whether Interpal provided material support 
to Hamas.”239  Plaintiffs did not need to show that the defendants knew or 
intended to support terrorist activities.240 
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The court additionally emphasized that a bank may not escape liability by 
demonstrating that a foreign government had a benign view of a terrorist 
organization.241  The fact that it was not illegal for NatWest to provide 
financial services to Interpal under British law was no defense to 
noncompliance with U.S. law, including the civil tort provision of the 
ATA.242  This indicates that banks must be diligent about U.S. designations 
to avoid liability.243 
In short, the Second Circuit held that to sustain a claim under § 2333(a), 
plaintiffs only have to prove § 2339B(a)(1)’s scienter requirement, which is 
directly incorporated into § 2333(a).244  Plaintiffs must show that the bank 
knew or was deliberately indifferent to whether it provided material support 
to a terrorist organization, irrespective of whether the funds were intended 
to support terrorist activities or facilitate the attack that injured plaintiffs.245 
III.  CLARIFYING THE § 2333(a) MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENT 
This part concludes that, as the statute stands, the Second Circuit best 
interprets the mental state requirement for § 2333(a).  Further, this part 
suggests that Congress should amend the ATA to clarify the state-of-mind 
requirement and impose a heightened culpability standard. 
A.  The Second Circuit’s Analysis Is Correct 
Under the current statutory framework, the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation of the § 2333(a) mens rea requirement should be adopted 
universally.246  This is because courts continue to hold that the material 
support statutes serve as predicate offenses that satisfy the international 
terrorism requirement for § 2333(a) purposes.247 
The material support and terrorist financing laws are criminal offenses, 
carrying punishments that include the possibility of life in prison.248  The 
ATA civil provision should not impose a higher mens rea standard than the 
underlying criminal offense of “international terrorism.”249  Therefore, if 
liability is predicated on a violation of § 2339B, courts should incorporate 
the knowledge requirement from § 2339B(a)(1), which prohibits the 
knowing provision of material support of any form to an FTO, regardless of 
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whether the defendant intended to support the FTO’s terrorist or 
nonterrorist activities.250 
If a violation of § 2333(a) is based on a violation of §§ 2339A or 2339C, 
courts should incorporate the state-of-mind requirements of those 
statutes.251  This, in turn, automatically incorporates the Seventh Circuit’s 
intended result in Boim III; violations of §§ 2339A or 2339C satisfy the 
deliberate wrongdoing standard because they already are conducted with 
the knowledge or intent for funds to be used to support acts of terrorism.252 
This provides dual objectives as the statute is currently understood.  The 
Second Circuit’s analysis provides for uniform application and also serves 
counterterrorism objectives aimed at stopping the flow of material support 
to terrorist groups.  Some courts currently agree that through its structure, 
the ATA creates primary liability (albeit, for secondary actors).253  Through 
the material support laws, Congress has spoken to the seriousness of 
engaging in even benign activities with terrorist organizations.254  It 
consistently emphasizes the fungible nature of money and the importance of 
preventing activities at every point along the causal chain.255  Although the 
material support laws were enacted after the ATA, and there are doubts 
about whether Congress envisioned the use of the material statutes this way, 
§ 2333(a) nonetheless serves to deter financial support and give victims 
significant civil recourse.256  If banks are diligent about the individuals and 
organizations with whom they are doing business, and have sufficient 
monitoring policies in place that reflect U.S. terrorism designations, they 
may be able to avoid triggering liability.257 
B.  Congress Should Nonetheless Amend the ATA 
The current application of the Antiterrorism Act nonetheless creates 
numerous issues and widespread confusion.  Congress should therefore 
amend the ATA to address the problematic interpretation of the statute.258  
There are several available causes of actions—theories including indirect 
assistance that creates direct liability; aiding and abetting liability; tort 
theories; international law claims; mixes of §§ 2339A, 2339B, and 2339C; 
and varying standards regarding necessary knowledge, intent, scienter, 
nexus, and causation.259  Interpretations are inconsistent and often 
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significantly different from one another.260  For this reason, Congress 
should amend the statute to clarify both the state-of-mind requirement and 
the bases for primary or secondary liability. 
By linking the civil suit provision of § 2333(a) with the material support 
statutes, courts have dramatically expanded the scope of the ATA.261  
Instead of limiting suits to actions against terrorists, courts are allowing 
civil suits to be brought against those providing services.262  This has given 
the ATA extreme, and perhaps unintended, breadth in practice.263 
In reaching a proposed resolution, Congress and the courts should be 
guided by two principles:  “(1) the requirements for liability cannot be so 
stringent as would leave loopholes for persons to easily evade its 
proscriptions; and (2) the requirements cannot be so vague or demanding 
that normal everyday functions such as doing business and giving to 
charities creates liability for the unwary.”264 
C.  Too Much Liability? 
As the statute and its application stand, the ATA may generate large civil 
judgments disproportionate to the conduct upon which plaintiffs base their 
claims.265  There are serious issues with holding that violations of the 
material support statutes in the financial services context qualify as 
“international terrorism” for ATA claims in the first place.266  Courts 
generally have not questioned or engaged in a thorough analysis of this 
shortcoming.  By extending the ATA civil suit provision to cover donations, 
the “Seventh Circuit’s en banc decision simply writes out of the statute its 
requirement that the acts at issue be ‘violent acts or acts dangerous to 
human life.’”267  Courts post-Boim III have adopted Posner’s statutory 
incorporation analysis to find primary liability for nonterrorist actors, 
holding that the provision of financial services are “acts dangerous to 
human life” that satisfy the international terrorism requirement for 
§ 2333(a) purposes.268  The courts take this analysis on its face without 
considering the potentially flawed bases upon which it relies.  The 
expansive reading provided by the Boim Court, however, and since adopted 
by other courts, serves to be more “results-oriented” than consistent with 
the text of the statute.  The requirement of violence, “acts dangerous to 
human life,” is central to § 2333(a); it is meant to target the actors directly 
responsible for acts of international terrorism.269 
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The Seventh Circuit’s analogy, likening giving money to Hamas to 
giving a child a gun, is strained.270  As noted by Geoffrey Sant, a loaded 
gun, by its nature, is a dangerous instrumentality that must be handled 
differently than money; it does not logically follow that providing routine 
banking services is a similarly dangerous act to human life.271  The liability 
analysis is akin to holding a bank liable for a death, caused by a gun, 
purchased by a known murderer, with funds withdrawn from one of its 
accounts at the bank.272  The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that one 
may be liable for the actions of another if one “knows that the other’s 
conduct constitutes a breach of duty and [nevertheless] gives substantial 
assistance or encouragement to the other.”273  “By contrast, as courts have 
long recognized, ‘[t]he maintenance of a bank account and the receipt or 
transfer of funds does not constitute substantial assistance’ to criminals who 
happen to keep accounts at a bank.”274  The “substantial assistance” 
reasoning has been discussed by the courts during a proximate cause 
analysis under the ATA, rather than questioning whether the underlying 
acts serve to meet the international terrorism requirement needed to trigger 
the mental state and proximate cause analysis in the first place.275 
Had Congress intended to extend the potential for massive liability 
(including through an attenuated chain of multilayered incorporation, as 
framed by the Boim decision) it would have.276  The Boim III interpretation 
engages in gap filling that does not provide for coherent standards of 
application.  This is especially apparent in light of a number of federal 
statutes that do provide for secondary liability through explicit aiding and 
abetting provisions to hold third parties directly and civilly liable to 
victims.277  One dissenting opinion in Boim III points out that this is 
“judicial activism at its most plain.”278  To hold banks primarily liable for 
acts of international terrorism, utilizing secondary liability tort 
requirements, does not make practical sense and does not meet the plain 
reading of the statute.279 
Engaging in a state-of-mind analysis for banks for acts of international 
terrorism is even harder to reconcile.  Banks provide financial services for 
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profit—not to fund terrorism.  Unless the financial institution directly 
intends to support terrorist activities, as in Linde for example, it should not 
be held primarily liable for attacks that are carried out by terrorist 
organizations.280  This is attenuated and particularly troublesome when 
analyzed through a state-of-mind analysis.  Liability currently rests on the 
following premise:  the bank knew, intended, or recklessly disregarded, 
during the provision of basic banking services, carried out in the ordinary 
course of business, that funds were being provided to terrorist organizations 
(or through charities or individuals that support terrorist organizations) that 
engage in acts of terrorism and substantially assisted and caused a terrorist 
attack for which it should be held directly liable.281 
Because the holdings of post-Boim courts have generally applied this 
flawed framework, Congress should act to remedy the infirmities of 
interpreting the statute this way.  Congress ultimately has a duty to ensure 
that § 2333(a) is applied uniformly.  However, the current application of 
§ 2333(a) is resulting in disparate treatment under the statute, and 
defendants face potentially bankrupting civil judgments on an attenuated 
basis of liability and causation that is inconsistent with the text of the 
statute.282 
CONCLUSION 
The jurisdictional split on the § 2333(a) state-of-mind requirement 
creates several problems.  Because the Seventh Circuit requires proof of a 
heightened mental state to support a claim under the ATA, plaintiffs have 
incentive to forum shop.  It will be easier to obtain a favorable judgment in 
jurisdictions where the plaintiffs must only prove the mens rea required to 
establish a material support violation.283  The split on the § 2333(a) mental 
state requirement will lead to inconsistent, and potentially disparate, civil 
judgments depending on the place of filing.  In the Second Circuit, a 
defendant may be liable for violating § 2333(a) for knowingly providing 
financial services to a designated FTO.284  The same defendant would not 
be found liable in a jurisdiction where a plaintiff also had to demonstrate 
that the defendant acted with knowledge or intention, or with reckless 
disregard that the funds were to be used to facilitate or finance a terrorist 
attack.285 
While the Second Circuit’s standard best interprets the statute as it is 
currently applied, the current ATA framework exposes secondary actors to 
disproportionate judgments for acts of international terror.  To remedy the 
issue, Congress should clarify the requisite § 2333(a) mental state, and it 
should amend the ATA to allow for primary liability only when a bank acts 
with heightened culpability in its provision of financial services to terrorist 
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organizations.  Unless Congress adopts liability for secondary actors 
through an explicit aiding and abetting provision, banks should not be 
subject to primary liability for the provision of financial services unless 
such provision is done with the knowledge or intent that the funds are used 
to finance acts of terrorism. 
 
